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On the coloniality of work: Commercial surrogacy in India 
 
Abstract: Relations of domination and subjugation in work manifest as class 
differentiation, but, more crucially, become intensified along lines of gender, sexual, and 
racial difference. This circumstance, I suggest, is neither accidental nor incidental. It is a 
historical effect of colonial logic that postulates gender, sexual, and racial Others as 
ontologically, and hence ethically, different. The articulation of difference as such 
legitimises gender, sexual, and racial Others as sites of domination and exploitation, and 
thereby naturalises them as objects of subordination in work. This circumstance may be 
described through the analytic of coloniality. The aim of this paper, then, is to explicate 
the coloniality of work as a means to comprehend the persistence of inequality and 
subjugation in its global organisation. Specifically, it underscores the imperative of 
confronting the ontological production of gender, sexual, and racial difference in the 
creation of relations of domination and subjugation, and thus, in the institution and 
operation of work qua work. I demonstrate the political urgency of such engagements 
through a discussion of commercial surrogacy in India. 
Keywords: race, coloniality, ontology, commercial surrogacy 
 
Introduction  
The question of work is fundamental to the operation of the modern political economic 
project. This centrality follows from the institution of work as a necessary and normative 
human activity – necessary because it secures material needs, and normative since it is 
viewed as an expression of moral subjectivity (Bataille, 1993; Weber, 2005). As such, 
work is the site for the accumulation of economic and symbolic value. This description 
of work, and the practices thereby inaugurated, establish and maintain relations of 
domination and subjugation (Marx & Engels, 1970; Marx, 1976; Deleule & Guéry, 2014). 
While this subjugation is manifest as class differentiation, it also, more crucially, follows 
lines of gender, sexual, and racial difference (Spivak, 1985; Sassen, 2002; Ehrenreich & 
Hochschild, 2003; Moghadam, 2005).  
The political salience of this latter form of difference has prompted calls for the rigorous 
study of difference (cf. Acker, 1990; Nkomo & Cox, 1996; Proudford & Nkomo, 2006). 
In the first instance, racial and feminist critiques sought to highlight how ‘regimes of 
inequality’ (Acker, 2006) structure work and organisations by restaging social relations of 
domination and subjugation (cf. Acker, 1992; Nkomo, 1992; Gherardi, 1994). Such 
critiques have given rise to the study not only of the racial and gender construction of 
work and organisation as such, but also of the effects of difference within these contexts. 
In particular, researchers have sought to highlight the experience of difference amongst 
those with marginalised identities (cf. Tomlinson, 2008; Mcdowell, Rootham & 
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Hardgrove, 2016; Wyatt & Silvester, 2105), and the ways in which marginalised peoples 
become compelled to ‘do’ race and gender in their working contexts (cf. Bruni, Gherardi 
& Poggio, 2004; McDonald, 2013; Liu, 2017). More recently, studies have appropriated 
the analytic of ‘intersectionality’ (Crenshaw, 1989) to demonstrate how relations of 
inequality and experiences of difference become intensified in the instance of multiply 
marginalised identities (cf. Atewologun, Sealy & Vinnicombe, 2016; Carrim & Nkomo, 
2016; Knight, 2016). The elaboration of such studies within the context of globalisation 
reveals how the production and effects of social difference are similarly replicated in the 
global organisation of work (cf. Parrenas, 2005; Dyer, McDowell & Batnitzky, 2010; 
Vora, 2010). 
To be sure, the purpose of such critical research is to advance the cause of social justice 
by creating the conditions for equality and inclusion in the theory and practice of work 
and organisation. Yet, in order to fulfil this agenda, the crucial question driving, or at 
least that should drive, the study of difference is that of the ‘why’ – i.e. why do relations 
of domination and subjugation emerge and endure in work and organisation (Jeanes, 
Knight & Martin, 2011)? While systemic analyses of organisation have offered a response 
of the former question (Acker, 1990; Nkomo, 1992), the latter remains under-theorised.  
The purpose of this paper, then, is to contribute to a theorisation of the persistence of 
subjugation along lines of gender, sexual, and racial difference in the global organisation 
of work. I start from the proposition that, insofar as work is a modality of modernity, 
any theorisation of inequality and exploitation in work must account for how difference 
has come to be instituted as a political and ethical signifier. Such an approach helps 
demonstrate how, rather than being a social artefact that becomes replicated within the 
context of work, difference is, in fact, fundamental to the unfolding of any and all 
activity circumscribed as work. To wit, the appearance of gender, sexual, and racial 
difference is the condition of possibility for the institution and operation of work qua 
work. 
In order to make this argument, I will expound the coloniality of work. Comprehending 
work through the analytic of coloniality reveals how its distribution along lines of gender, 
sexual, and racial difference stems from the differential valuation of life and its associated 
activities. It reveals how relations of domination and exploitation in the organisation of 
work are an effect of, and authorised by, an ethical subjugation inherent in the unfolding of 
gender, sexual, and racial difference. Such an accounting of work reveals the ontological 
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priority of difference. It allows us to see how inequality and exploitation in work are not 
merely structural effects but instead are ontological effects of the institution of difference 
in modernity. It becomes clear, then, that it is the ontological basis of difference – 
specifically gender, sexual, and racial difference – that enables the persistence, and indeed 
the proliferation, of subjugation in the global organisation of work. Unless we reckon 
with difference as such, any endeavour at justice or liberation remain troublingly 
incomplete.  
In order to substantiate this proposition, I will undertake a discussion of commercial 
surrogacy in India. Here, I analyse the relationship between surrogates and intended 
parents to reveal how difference becomes postulated therein. Moreover, I will show how 
this difference is the condition of possibility for the institution of surrogacy qua work. I 
thus affirm the coloniality of surrogacy work. More crucially, however, I will demonstrate 
how the ethical viability of commercial surrogacy is an effect of the coloniality of work.  
I begin by providing a brief overview of the social context of commercial surrogacy in 
India. Thereafter, I provide an account of the analytic of coloniality to explain its 
relevance to the study of surrogacy, in particular, and work, in general. In the three 
sections that follow, I analyse the structural specificities of the Indian market in order to 
affirm surrogacy as an instantiation par excellence of the coloniality of work. More crucially, 
I show how the postulation of an ontological difference between surrogates and intended 
parents is the condition of possibility for the emergence of surrogacy as a form of work. 
I thereby explicate how difference is fundamental to the institution of work qua work. In 
the final section, I will thus argue that any serious consideration of subjugation in work 
and organisation must address coloniality as the founding logic of the Eurocentric 
ethico-economic project that we call ‘modernity’1.  
The social context of commercial surrogacy  
Commercial surrogacy represents the monetisation – and in the Indian context, the 
marketisation – of women’s procreative activity. As such, it may be located within India’s 
postcolonial developmentalist trajectory. Insofar as development presents itself as a 
strategy of economic intervention intended towards human progress and, thereby, 
progress towards humanness (cf. Escobar, 1995; Nederveen Pieterse, 2001; Wilson, 2013), 																																																								
1  For a critique of how ‘a particular [Eurocentered] history’ has become singularised and universalised as 
‘modernity’ see Escobar (2007) 
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commercial surrogacy represents the promise of recuperation for economically and 
socially ‘underdeveloped’ women. This is especially so in the Indian context wherein 
moral and economic panic about population growth, and hence the reproductive 
capacities of the poor, has a long history rooted in the colonial project (Harkavy & Roy, 
2007). In the early- to mid-twentieth century, colonial and native authorities were 
engaged in producing a population discourse concerned with ‘public health’ and the 
creation of a ‘fit’ society (Nair, 2011). Central to this discourse was a concern with 
poverty as a cause and effect of population growth. The trope of ‘tragic Indian 
motherhood’ (Nair, 2011: 233) – i.e. of young mothers confronted with high rates of 
maternal and infant mortality due to early marriage and frequent births – took on special 
significance in mobilising calls for reproductive health education. The colonial 
government, however, was unwilling to officially introduce family planning measures or 
intervene in population control, citing concerns about religious and cultural difference.  
Regardless, this discourse had taken sufficient hold so that it remained a major concern 
for successive post-independence Indian governments. In 1952, India became the first 
country in the world to institute an official program for population control (Harkavy & 
Roy, 2007). Over successive decades, these programs have taken different forms. I will 
outline these in greater detail in a later section. What is of note is that these programs 
have consistently been aimed at the poor. Both, colonial and nationalist agendas 
postulated the poor as ontologically different. This difference is articulated, in the first 
instance, as religious and cultural difference, and then a general ‘backwardness’, all of 
which signify a lack of scientific rationality. The Indian context thus offers a clear 
example of how colonial discourses become re-written as nationalist and globalist 
discourses without displacing coloniality2 . It is in this context that I will examine 
commercial surrogacy in India.  
																																																								
2  It is worth noting that the colonial logic underlying the surrogacy market is evident, too, in the 
exclusions it enacts. In the Indian context, homosexual couples and unmarried individuals are barred 
from entering into surrogacy relations. This, in the first instance, is the effect of the postulation of non-
heteronormative appearances as counter to the ‘“natural” order of things’ (Lewin, 1995: 103), so that 
those instituted as sexual Others are foreclosed from the possibility of legitimate reproductive activity. 
We may thus observe how coloniality – i.e. the institution of various Others as ontologically and 
ethically different – structures kinship in modernity. I will discuss this more generally in a later section. 
In the contemporary moment, the foreclosure of the sexual Other has come to be rewritten either as a 
contingent inclusion – as evidenced by the legitimation of procreation via ART amongst queer and 
single individuals in certain contexts (cf. Mamo, 2007) – or as a continued exclusion on the basis of 
moralistic valuation, as evident in the Indian surrogacy market. The form that such rewriting takes is 
dependent on the socio-historical specificity of a given context; yet neither of these situations represents 
a displacement of ontological difference, only a different manifestation of it. An engagement with the 
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Surrogacy begins with the in vitro fertilisation of eggs that are planted into the surrogate’s 
womb. The surrogate is then charged with the responsibility of bringing the foetus to 
term for its intended parent or parents. The past few years have witnessed a marked 
increase in interest in commercial surrogacy, especially of the gestational form. In this 
form of surrogacy, the surrogate merely ‘rents her womb’ to carry another’s eggs – 
whether an intended mother’s or a donor’s – to term. Gestational surrogacy is, therefore, 
popular because it enables genetic procreation through non-sexual means. Thus far, the 
surrogacy market in India has only allowed for gestational surrogacy3. That is, even when 
donor eggs are needed, these cannot be provided by the gestational mother (Ministry of 
Health and Family Welfare, 2010). This is a significant particularity of the Indian market 
that has made it attractive to potential intended parents, especially in the transnational 
context. 
Moreover, the costs associated with surrogacy in India are substantially lower than in 
many countries, especially in the global north (Vora, 2009a; Centre for Social Research, 
2011). A primary reason for this cost differential is the difference in surrogate pay. Also. 
surrogates in India are paid in five instalments, with a substantial portion, about 75%, 
made after delivery of the child (Deonandan & Bente, 2012). In the case of a miscarriage 
or an otherwise necessary termination the surrogate is not owed the full payment 
promised her. This minimises the financial risk of the intended parents while increasing 
that of the surrogate mother.  
Surrogates in India are recruited mainly from amongst the poor, and receive in 
compensation over 9 months what they would normally make in 9 years (Vora, 2009a). 
They must be 21-35 years of age, be married, and already have children of their own. 
They must demonstrate that their pregnancies were without complication, and do not 
have a recent history of substance use. Word-of-mouth recruitment proves to be a more 
effective practice wherein ‘brokers’ – former surrogates, women who are unable to be 
surrogates, and midwives – play a crucial role (Pande, 2010). For, in addition to 
dispensing information regarding the market, brokers are able to address the 
misinformation and any prevailing stigma associated with surrogacy. Indeed, the nature 																																																																																																																																																														
socio-historical circumstance that legitimates the exclusion of non-heteronormative subjects from the 
Indian market would add complexity to the understanding of surrogacy as a biopolitical project. 
However, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.  
3  This requirement has been removed from the new Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2016 but the bill has not 
yet been passed. 	
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of the surrogacy relation recalls anxieties surrounding the ‘selling’ of the body so that it 
comes to be mis/understood as a version of prostitution. However, brokers and 
clinicians intervene to assuage these anxieties by asserting surrogacy as a sharing of 
maternity so that it becomes understood as respectable and noble activity. 
Yet, the possibility of undertaking only gestational surrogacy is quite explicitly intended 
to eschew any possibility of a genetic tie between the surrogate mother and the baby. 
This consolidates the surrogate’s position as a mere worker, or more specifically, a 
service-provider, without any rights, whether biologically naturalized or legally defined, 
over the baby. Indeed, the splitting off of genetic versus gestational maternity, with 
genetic maternity being the privileged, legally recognised form, is a particularity of the 
Indian market that makes it especially popular4. 
Given the relatively recent emergence of the surrogacy market, the ethical issues arising 
therein are yet under constant review. Indeed, the Indian Parliament has been debating 
an Artificial Reproductive Technologies (ART) Bill since at least 2008. In its most recent 
iteration, released in November 2016 as the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, the Indian 
government indicated its intention to ban all forms of commercial surrogacy (Verma, 
2017). Surrogacy was now to be permitted only in an altruistic form – i.e. the bill states 
that ‘[n]o payment other than reasonable medical expenses can be made to the surrogate 
mother - and, even then, under numerous stipulations. Most significantly, only Indian 
citizens married for a minimum of 5 years are allowed to appoint ‘a close relative’ as 
surrogate. The bill thus effectively bars foreign citizens from engaging in any form of 
surrogacy relations. While this latest version of the Bill is still under consideration, should 
it pass, it will have a significant impact on the Indian market, designated the ‘surrogacy 
capital of the world’ (Sherwell, 2015). 
																																																								
4  This separation is not as juridically clear, as for instance, in the US. The competing rights of intended 
parents and surrogate mothers are adjudicated autonomously by each state. Given public(ised) 
precedents, wherein surrogate mothers have claimed the children they have borne, U.S. couples are 
often wary of entering into surrogacy contracts at home. Much of this legal ambiguity around surrogacy 
contracts resides in the distinction between genetic and gestational ties and the debate around which tie 
is foundational to the determination of maternity. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the 
gestational mother is considered legal mother of the child she has given birth to. Intended parents are 
required to file a Parental Order (PO) in order to gain custody of the child. However, a PO cannot be 
filed within 6 weeks after the birth and should a surrogate mother decide to keep the child, she has the 
legal right to do so (Norton, Hudson & Culley, 2013: 273). Consequently, surrogacy contracts in the US 
or UK are always open to future litigation. 
In many European countries, including France, German, Italy and Spain, surrogacy remains illegal. 
(European Parliament & Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, 2013). 
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The impending decision by the Indian government has caused considerable outcry from 
numerous quarters, including fertility clinics, intended parents, and surrogate mothers. 
On the one hand, the circumscription of people who may participate in surrogacy 
contracts is considered an infringement upon the right to parenthood. Additionally, the 
restriction of surrogacy to its altruistic form is viewed as a curtailment of women’s 
economic opportunity and a contravention of autonomy. On the other hand, the action 
proposed by the Indian government is intended to protect women who undertake 
surrogacy as well as children born thereby (cf. Tanderup, Reddy, Patel & Nielsen, 2015). 
Indeed, critics of commercial surrogacy note the persistence of global economic 
inequalities as enabling the commodification of women and children that underlies the 
practice of surrogacy (Vora, 2009a,b; Bailey, 2011; Pande, 2011, 2016; Majumdar, 2014). 
Consequently, the proposal of the Indian government is consistent with laws in many 
parts of the world wherein concerns about the ethics of commodification have rendered 
commercial surrogacy illegal (“India introduces legislation to ban surrogacy tourism”, 
2015).  
To be sure, this form of ethical debate is neither essential nor unique to the practice of 
commercial surrogacy, and is in fact a reflection of ethical debates on relations of 
domination and subjugation in work, in general. This, I suggest, is an effect of the 
coloniality of work. In the next section, I highlight the importance of engaging coloniality 
as a crucial methodology for comprehending domination and subjugation in the 
organisation of work. To do so, I outline the social character of work and the role of 
difference therein. I focus specifically on Kathi Weeks’ The problem with work (2011) 
because her deployment of a Weberian framework offers a particularly useful analytical 
structure for revealing the operation of coloniality, in general. Thereafter, I draw upon 
conceptualisations of coloniality (Quijano, 2000, 2007; Mignolo, 2011) in order to explain 
its meanings and implications for the study of difference in work and organisation.  
Methodology: On coloniality  
The question of work, according to Weeks (2011), is fundamentally political. This is 
because, on the one hand, work is a site of social normativisation. On the other hand, 
and following from this disciplinary character, work is also the site of political freedom. 
This duality of work is explicated by addressing the institution of modern society as a 
‘work society’. A work society is one wherein work operates to fulfil not only economic 
but also subjective need. That is, in a work society, work is the fundamental means of 
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actualising life in both, its material (i.e. economic) and idealist (i.e. social, political, and 
cultural) dimensions. Even so, the description of work is associated with the acquisition 
of wages. Thus, in addition to an economic function, wages perform the symbolic 
function of granting recognition to particular forms of activity as work. The motivation 
for wages – which appears as a will to work – thus obtains a moral texture, wherein 
work, as the attainment of wages, becomes an expression of one’s specifically human 
capacities. In Weeks’ account, this social, or more precisely ethical, character of work is 
instituted through three complementary elements: (a) a work ethic that operates through 
(b) a subjectification function that renders work as (c) a disciplinary apparatus.  
First, drawing on Weber (1958) Weeks notes how the imperative to work is established 
through its propagation as ‘a calling’. The mythology of work woven by modernity posits 
it as a virtuous act – willing individuals to participate in it as an act of self-determination 
and engage with it as a process of self-realisation. The ‘work ethic’ thus engendered 
‘promote[s] our acceptance of and powerful identification with work and help[s] to make 
it such a potent object of desire and privileged field of aspiration’ (Weeks, 2011: 12). The 
promulgation of this ethic is intended to interpellate individuals into differential roles and 
positionalities with respect to work. This is the subjectification function of the work 
ethic which produces the consciousness of ‘employer’ and ‘employee’, so as to authorise 
employers as exploiting subjects and garner consent from employees as exploitable 
subjects (2011: 39–40, 53). Insofar as work is thus sanctioned as a relation of domination 
and subjugation, it is able to create, appropriate, and transform subjectivities in the 
service of capital. To wit, work is a disciplinary apparatus charged with the manufacture 
of docile subjects. This function of work is especially insidious with regards gender, 
sexually and racially subordinated subjects.  
Given that work is activity granted recognition as such through the conferral of wages, 
its very definition is contingent upon what forms of productive activity are 
valued/included and devalued/excluded. These negotiations, Weeks acknowledges, are 
undertaken around gender, sexual, and racial lines (2011: 14). Historically, unwaged 
activity has been performed by enslaved and colonised peoples, and by nominally free 
women, in the form of slave and colonial (including reproductive) labour; whereas waged 
activity has been the provenance of white men. This separation of waged and unwaged 
activity – of work and non-work – along lines of racial, sexual and gender difference is 
not a historical accident but rather a specific and enduring effect of coloniality.  
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Anibal Quijano describes coloniality as an arrangement of power propagated through a 
‘cognitive model’ (2000: 552) that affirms a categorical distinction between Europe and 
non-Europe. Here, Europe is mythologised as the teleological locus of the world – i.e. as 
the space where all history of human civilization culminates. This description follows 
from the presumption that the space of Europe is a manifestation of rationality that is an 
essential and exclusive provenance of the European mind. In contrast, non-Europe is 
designated as the space of irrationality – primitive, without the capacity for historical or 
teleological mo(tiva)tion – and, hence, lacking any ethical value. This difference is posited 
as ‘natural’ – or, more precisely, ethical degradation of the space of non-Europe is 
authorized by locating it in the state of nature. Accordingly, the forms of existence that 
inhabit these spaces are affirmed as ontologically closer to nature (2000: 555; see also 
Silva, 2007). Lacking rational capacity and moral will, they are cast as lesser or non- 
beings, instituted in unresolvable difference. Thus coloniality institutes an ontological 
and ethical difference between Europe and its Others (Quijano, 2000; Mignolo, 2011) 
Crucially, this arrangement of power inaugurates a ‘new technology of 
domination/exploitation, in this case race/labor … articulated in such a way that the two 
elements appeared naturally associated’ (Quijano, 2000: 537). That is, the coloniality of 
power not only assigns specific forms of activity to specific forms of existence, but also 
makes these associations appear natural. Indeed, coloniality affirms those belonging to 
non-Europe as incapable of higher orders of activity due to their rational and moral 
deficiencies. Moreover, given the ontological resemblance between non-Europe(ans) and 
nature, their bodies, too, are viewed as of nature and, hence, ‘dominable and exploitable’ 
(2000: 555). To wit, coloniality naturalises the activity of racial, gender, and sexual Others 
as that which does not merit recompense – i.e. not work, since work, as noted above, is a 
descriptor of waged activity. Thus, fundamental to the conception and operation of work 
is the institution of racial, gender, and sexual difference as ontological and hence ethical 
difference. This circumstance represents the coloniality of work.  
The expansion of work in contemporary society – whereby previously unwaged activity 
becomes waged – does not indicate a displacement of coloniality. As Quijano asserts, 
given that ‘the racial axis… has proven to be more durable and stable than the 
colonialism in whose matrix it was established… the model of power that is globally 
hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality’ (2000: 533). Indeed, even as the 
expansion of work represents the possibility of a material emancipation for the racially, 
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sexually or gender subjugated Other, it maintains ontological difference. The inclusion of 
racial, gender, and sexual others into contemporary work society, then, represents neither 
ethical equity nor ontological emancipation. Instead, what unfolds is a re-writing of 
difference in a socio-cultural grammar even as the ontological basis of difference, as the 
condition of possibility for subjugation, persists, albeit as a hidden script (cf. Mignolo, 
2000).  
Recalling Weeks, the incorporation of previously unwaged activity as under- or 
subordinately waged work is legitimised by the discourse of the work ethic which 
sanctions low wages ‘as a reflection of individual character rather than a consequence of 
the structure of waged employment’ (2011: 61). Weeks acknowledges the ontological 
force of the work ethic – i.e. its role in sanctioning exploiting and exploitable subjects 
(2011: 53) – and how it interpellates subjects differentially as per gender, sex, race, and 
other categories of difference. Yet, following the preceding discussion of coloniality, it 
becomes imperative to comprehend this differential interpellation not merely as socio-
historical effect – i.e. wherein the incorporation of unwaged activity, historically 
associated with the Others of Europe, is transformed into the subordinated labour 
performed by racial, gender and sexual others. Rather, the analytic of coloniality 
highlights how, insofar as the work ethic posits work as a calling and sanctions wages as 
an expression of the will to work, it is rooted, in the first instance, in the foreclosure of 
the Others of Europe. In its contemporary articulation, the work ethic presents itself to 
these Others as a recuperative force, whereby inclusion into the work society is fulfilled 
through the self-determined mobilisation of exploitability, postulated as an effect of 
ethical, or more precisely, ontological difference. Thus, coloniality remains fundamental 
to the unfolding of activity as work.  
In the next three sections, I analyse the Indian surrogacy market through Weeks’ 
tripartite formulation of work. That is, I show how the market propagates a particular 
form of work ethic in order to subjectify poor Indian women as workers and thereby 
discipline them in becoming proper modern subjects. In so doing, I will reveal how the 
postulation of an ethical difference between poor women and intended parents is the 
condition of possibility for the unfolding of this process. I thereby affirm the coloniality 
of surrogacy work. 
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Surrogacy work as a calling  
The function of the work ethic, according to Weeks (2011), is to institute work as a 
virtuous activity by positing it as a calling. As indicated earlier, surrogates in India are 
recruited primarily from amongst the poor. This occurs through poor women with 
children experiencing themselves as ‘bad mothers’ (Pande, 2010) – i.e. the inability to 
ensure the economic and social betterment of their children becomes evidence of the 
non-fulfilment of their maternal duties. As such, an economic condition – that of being 
poor – becomes posited, instead, as an ethical lack. It is precisely this lack, however, that 
is a condition of possibility for producing a ‘good surrogate’.  
Fertility clinics tap into women’s anxieties about being a ‘bad mother’ to call them into 
work. This call is not merely an economic but a moral one (Vora, 2009b,a). The work of 
surrogacy is instituted, in fact, as an exercise of maternity. First, this work enables poor 
mothers to fulfil their duties towards their own children. It is simultaneously posited as 
an act of sharing the joys of maternity, or parenthood, with intended parents – ‘of being 
able to give a gift to an infertile couple that is a gift usually given only by god’ (2009a: 
273; Majumdar, 2014). Such affirmations, of course, are not so much a denial of the 
financial motivations of their undertakings, as a subsumption of economic need under 
individual virtue. Surrogacy thus seems to substantiate the recuperative power of work – 
first, due to the valorisation of the activity of those left on the outside or at the margins 
of the waged sphere, and second, because in establishing itself as a calling it enables the 
expression of ethical subjectivity. It is precisely at this juncture, however, that the 
coloniality of work makes itself starkly apparent. 
The surrogacy market interpellates both, poor Indian mothers and couples desirous of 
yet unable to bear children, as enterprising subjects. The enterprising subject is the ideal 
subject of the market – one who is self-reliant, responsible, ambitious and astute. They 
recognise work as a means of self-realisation, and are willing to utilise all means available 
to them in attainting this goal (Gay, 1996; Ainsworth & Hardy, 2008; Wee & Brooks, 
2012). In undertaking surrogacy work, then, poor women follow the call to submit the 
primary means of production available to them – i.e. the body and its capacities – to 
ART, choosing to ‘‘construct’ and [make] what they will ‘out of’ the givens of existence 
and environmental constraints’ (Strathern, 1992: 39). Beyond subjection to work, the 
enterprising subject also recognises consumption as a means to self-actualisation – one 
for whom ‘there is, in a sense, no choice not to consume’ (1992: 37; original emphasis). 
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Intended parents are thus also able to confirm themselves as enterprising subjects 
through the consumption of ART as a means to realise parenthood since ‘[t]o imagine an 
absence of desire would be an affront to the means that exist to satisfy it’ (1992: 37). As 
such, the surrogacy relation appears as virtuous exchange between enterprising subjects. 
Yet, this exchange is, in fact, also a consumptive one.  
In subjecting herself to ART, the surrogate mother answers the call to not only work but 
also become the means of production. That is, she is both the raw material (as organic 
matter) and the tool (its physiological capacities) fundamental to her work. This is 
especially so during the gestation period when her body and its capacities are the only 
technology utilised. Consequently, the consumptive relation of intended parents extends 
beyond ART to the surrogate mother herself.  To wit, the surrogate mother is an object 
of consumption for intended parents. This relation – between being consumed and 
consuming – is the appearance of an ethical differential. The consummability of poor 
Indian women is the condition of possibility for their emergence as surrogate mothers; 
whereas the materialisation of intended parents is contingent upon their existence already 
as consumers. Thus, the mobilisation of maternity as an ethic in the surrogacy market 
actualises, in fact, the exploitability of poor women. This circumstance, I will later 
demonstrate, is an effect of the naturalisation of poor women as ethically degraded as 
opposed to the ethical idealisation of intended parents. This postulation of an ethical 
difference is fundamental to the relationship between surrogates and intended parents, 
and thus represents the coloniality therein. 
Surrogacy work as the subjectification of modern workers 
The function of the work ethic, according to Weeks, is to manufacture subjects that 
consent to becoming exploiters and the exploited. In the context of the Indian surrogacy 
market, this manufacture occurs in the space of surrogacy ‘homes’. As per the formal and 
legal policies of the Indian market, to be a surrogate, a woman must, for cultural and 
biological reasons, already be a mother. Indeed, as detailed above, this status as mother is 
a key recruitment strategy for surrogacy clinics. Yet, once recruited, the woman’s status 
as mother is suspended for the duration of the surrogacy process. This suspension is 
effected by the existence of surrogate ‘homes’ where surrogates are required to live, so as 
to be ‘protected’ from the demands of their own family lives and also so that they may be 
constantly monitored. During this time, the movement of surrogates around and outside 
the hostel is quite restricted, in order to minimise any issues caused by exertion or 
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contagion. Surrogates are allowed visits from their husbands/partners and children; 
however, they are encouraged not to stay overnight. This regimentation of life in the 
hostels is legitimised through the positioning of surrogates as unfamiliar with, and thus 
unqualified for, modern ways of being a ‘good mother’. As one doctor interviewed in 
Pande’s study states:  
In a way it’s also very good for all the mothers to stay together, laugh, play, and 
stay happy. It’s a good way of passing time for them. And it prevents them from 
always wanting to go home. If we send her home, she is bound to start doing 
housework. She doesn’t know any better. But here we can ensure that she gets 
complete rest. When the surrogate has her own children, she has them without 
even realising what happened – in fun and games. But in this pregnancy a lot 
depends on her actions. And we want nothing to go wrong. In the other hostel, 
we’ve also started English and computer lessons for them. We want them to 
learn something, some skills to face the world better after staying with us. We 
can’t take care of them forever! (2010: 983; original emphasis) 
Thus, the surrogate home thus becomes posited as a space wherein poor women can 
establish themselves as modern through the cultivation of a worker subjectivity  
Furthermore, during the course of their pregnancies, surrogates receive psychological 
counselling on how to be good ‘mother-workers’ (Pande, 2010)– that is, how to be a 
good worker without developing, or at least without being affected by, any affective ties 
with the child she is carrying. Vora’s research demonstrates, for example, how surrogate 
mothers are encouraged ‘to think of their bodies through the western medical model, 
where the body operates like a machine composed of parts and exists largely separate 
from the self’ (2009a: 271). Pande likewise finds that surrogates are counselled to remain 
‘constantly aware of [their] disposability and the transience of [their] identity as a worker 
and yet [to love] the product of [their] transient labour (the foetus) as [their] own’ (2010: 
978). This love, however, entails a displacement of the self in favour of intended parents. 
Surrogates are trained to ‘love [the foetus] even more than you love your own, because it 
is someone else’s’ (2010: 978). Consequently, any trace of affective attachment that the 
surrogate might experience towards the child she carries is pre-emptively counselled 
away. This circumstance represents the dispossession of the surrogate’s maternal, or 
affective, subjectivity, voluntary and temporary though it may be. As such, this process 
of dispossession renders her ‘a becoming being for’ the intended parents. 
I borrow this phrase from Hortense Spillers’ account of the African slave trade with/in 
the Americas, wherein she describes the condition that inaugurates the slave as a ‘theft of 
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the body’. Here, theft does not merely indicate kidnapping but, more crucially, ‘a wilful 
and violent… severing of the captive body from its motive will, its active desire’ so that 
‘the captive body reduces to a thing, a becoming being for the captor’ (1987: 67). To be 
sure, the production of poor women as surrogates cannot be comprehended as the 
severing of motive will precisely because of their interpellation as workers. Yet, the space 
of the surrogacy home does attempt a form of theft of the body. The suspension of 
bodily autonomy and affective subjectivity enacted therein represents a negation of the 
will of the surrogate intended towards the will of intended parents. It is as such, in this 
‘becoming being for’, that the surrogacy relation reveals itself as an ethical transaction 
between poor Indian women and intended parents.  
The subjectification of poor Indian women as surrogates proceeds through an appeal to 
precisely that aspect of the self – their maternal affect – that they must ultimately 
dispossess themselves of in order to fulfil the possibility of kinship for intended parents. 
Surrogacy work represents a diminishing of the subjectivity of poor women. Of course, 
this circumstance of subjective transformation describes the universal condition of 
workers within a capitalist system of production (cf. Pateman, 1988; Williams, 1991). Yet, 
unlike most forms of work, the primary form of value produced by this subjection is not 
economic but ethical value. That is, given that the labour of the surrogate mother is 
objectified in the child she bears, she is a producer of ethical value. This value accrues to 
intended parents through the realisation of kinship that the transaction enables5. As 
evidenced above, the suspension of the surrogates’ own maternity is the condition of 
possibility for the actualisation of intended parents qua parents. In other words, the 
negated maternal subjectivity of poor women becomes the site for the accrual of parental 
subjectivity of intended parents. The possibility of such a negation, and the concomitant 
objectification, is an effect of the postulation of an ethical difference authorised by 
coloniality.  
Surrogacy work as the disciplining of difference 
Weeks (2011) describes work as a disciplinary apparatus intended towards the 
manufacture of subjects servile to capital. In the case of poor Indian women, such 
servility is produced through the containment of their reproductive capacities. As noted 																																																								
5  cf. Donzelot (1979), Foucault (1990) and Jordanova (1995) on the modern family as a space of 
discipline intended towards the production of the bourgeois subject. As such, participation in the rituals 
of kinship signifies the ethical value – indeed, the humanness – of the individual, so that failure to create 
kinship ties signals an ethical failure. (also see Eng (2003) on the significance of queer adoptions.) 
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above, India was the first country in the world to institute an official population control 
program. The putative goal of the program was to modernise poor Indians through the 
cultivation of a ‘rational preference for child “quality” over child “quantity”’ (Chatterjee 
& Riley, 2001: 820). In its early years, the program focused on the dissemination of 
information about and means for contraception. However, given the limited 
effectiveness of these policies, combined with the financial crisis of 1966, the family 
planning program was transformed from ‘one providing voluntary services into an 
incentive- and target-driven population reduction program’, including sterilisation 
practices, and in particular, compulsory sterilisation for men (2001: 824). The political 
fallout from these policies resulted in an official recommitment to an educational and 
voluntary family planning policy.  
In the past two decades, the program has been directed especially towards adolescent 
girls ‘so that they grow up as better young women, and are able to make informed 
decisions in their roles as mothers and individuals’ (2001: 827). It seeks to emphasise ‘the 
importance of rational thinking, of individual agency, and setting goals’ especially with 
regards their fertility, posited as ‘a dangerous result of “poverty, ignorance and cultural 
inhibitions”’ (2001: 832). The benefit of such planning, as advertised in state-produced 
literature, entails the achievement of an Indian middle-class life-style, represented by 
access to ‘electricity, piped water, glasses of milk, sewing machines, bicycles, tractors, and 
televisions’ (2001: 831).  
The preceding outline of fertility control practices in India reveals how the state uses 
moral interventions to discipline the economically dispossessed. As such, sterilisation and 
surrogacy are two sides of the same coin (see Pande, 2016 for a discussion of commercial 
surrogacy as “neo-eugenics”). In the context of surrogacy, the problematic fertility – 
imagined as the cause and consequence of the poverty trap – is harnessed and made 
productive. Indeed, by becoming subject to surrogacy work, poor women not only 
become potential middle-class subjects but they also become subjects of scientific 
rationality through their subjection to technology (ART) and through the self-determined 
management of fertility. The surrogacy market thus functions as a disciplinary force 
directed towards poor women. The possibility of such disciplining, however, is 
contingent upon the positioning of poor Indian women as bioavailable and operable. 
Lawrence Cohen (2008) uses ‘bioavailability’ and ‘operability’ as analytics that describe 
the circumstance of the global market for human organs. They are effects of modern 
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sensibility wherein the political subjectivity of donors (sellers) is contingent upon market 
participation, activated here by the exercise of property relations with one’s body. 
Bioavailability, then, is the condition of being ‘available for the selective disaggregation of 
one’s cells or tissues and their reincorporation into another body (or machine)’ (2008: 
83). As such, it represents a voluntary trade of pure biological life. Yet, Cohen views this 
trade as a ‘vampiric transaction’ enabled by the condition of operability. Operability 
signifies ‘the degree to which one’s belonging to and legitimate demands of the state are 
mediated through invasive medical commitment’ (2008: 86). Using the examples of 
sterilisation, ungendering surgery and cataract operations, in addition to transplants, 
Cohen theorises the operable body as that which may be brought under relations of 
force with the state to amend its functionality in accordance with an imposed morality.  
The condition of operability thus signifies ethical degradation. Indeed, this degradation is 
the condition of possibility for state-sponsored population control programs to install 
poor Indian women as bioavailable. The surrogacy market preserves this description 
through the commercialisation of bioavailability whereby the market displaces the state in 
bringing the operable body in relation to itself. Here, the dangerous, because excessive, 
fertility of poor women is disciplined by making it subject to capital. Yet, in the first 
instance, this subjection is an effect of the will of intended parents. That is, the 
operability of poor women makes them bioavailable to intended parents for the transfer 
of biological matter objectified in the baby.  
Discussion: Surrogacy and the coloniality of work 
The institution of surrogacy as a form of work economically recuperates poor Indian 
women thus far excluded from or marginalised within the sphere of waged activity. In so 
doing, it promises them recognition as properly modern subjects by enabling the 
expression of moral agency through self-determined subjection to capital and scientific 
rationality. Surrogacy work therefore appears as a moment of ethical and economic 
emancipation. Indeed, commercial surrogacy represents the valorisation of women’s 
procreative activities. On the one hand, this is politically significant, since the devaluation 
of reproductive work – i.e. its relegation to the sphere of economically unproductive 
activity – has been central to gender and sexual subjugation under capitalism (Fortunati, 
1995; Federici, 2004). On the other hand, however, the valorisation of procreative 
activity through surrogacy becomes possible only through the utilisation by women of 
their bodies, its capacities and its affects, as the means of production. In particular, 
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women must render their bodies as raw material. This circumstance is a contemporary 
instantiation of the originary creation of ‘free labour’ under capital, wherein it is not the 
worker who is liberated, per se, but land, as raw material, which is made ‘“free” to 
function as a means of accumulation and exploitation, rather than as a means of 
subsistence’ (Federici, 2004: 75). Similarly, what is liberated by the surrogacy market is 
not the (poor) woman as worker but rather her reproductive matter as a site of 
accumulation and exploitation rather than autonomous action. As such, the surrogacy 
market is an instantiation of what David Harvey designates ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ (2005).  
Accumulation by dispossession, unlike primitive accumulation, proceeds through the 
manufacture of opportunities for investment in regions of the world that have not yet 
been totally subsumed by, and thus mark the outside of, capital. This is made possible, in 
the first instance, by deliberate suppression of capital in particular zones (peoples and 
places) to render them as the outside, or periphery, of the global economic system. The 
process culminates when capital, having removed itself from circulation can bring the 
now dispossessed into a relationship of bondage with it. This theory is applicable to the 
emergence of the surrogacy market as well.  
The surrogacy relation appears as a relation of economic difference. Yet, it is, in fact, the 
objectification of ethical differentiation, a reiteration of the colonial difference instituted 
between devalued/devalorised and valued/valorised forms of life. The institution of 
gender, racial and sexual Others in ontological difference dispossessed them of ethical 
value. This ethical dispossession is the condition of possibility for the degradation of 
their activity as not work. Indeed, this is fundamental to the operation of colonial and 
slave labour, as well as women’s labour, especially reproductive work, even outside of 
colonial and slave relations. This circumstance enables the production of not only 
economic value but also ethical value. That is, the activity of gender, racial and sexual 
Others, because unwaged, consolidates their ethically degraded circumstance, instituted, 
in the first instance, as an effect of ontological difference – thereby enabling the white 
male subject, because waged or propertied, to consolidate himself as Subject, and his 
activity as work. To wit, the dispossession of ethical value from gender, sexual and racial 
difference Others is the condition of possibility for the accumulation of ethical and 
economic value for idealised subjects. It is this inseparability of ethical and economic 
appearance and effect that Quijano affirms as fundamental to coloniality 
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This is evident, no doubt, in surrogacy work. In the first instance, colonial difference 
rendered the Indian woman as a gender, sexual and racial Other. The emergence of the 
so-called postcolonial moment then brought forth an attempt to re-inscribe gender, 
sexual and racial difference through a socio-culture script. Yet, as already noted, the 
ontological basis of this difference did not merely disappear, instead it became hidden. 
Moreover, insofar as work requires an exploitable subject, colonial logic now articulated 
these Others as ‘poor’ (Wynter, 2003). That is, devaluation, or ethical dispossession, is 
approached in the current global historical context as the appearance of poverty6. In the 
case of commercial surrogacy, this devaluation is the condition of possibility for the 
accumulation of economic value (for clinics) and ethical value (for intended parents). 
Commercial surrogacy thus substantiates the inseparability of economic and ethical 
difference in its unfolding. In particular, it enables us to recognise how the appearance of 
ontological difference – signified through gender, sexual, and racial difference – 
authorises relations of domination and of subjugation, and is thus the condition for 
possibility for the institution of work qua work. Commercial surrogacy thereby reveals 
the coloniality of work. Indeed, it affirms the imperative for critiques of work to 
comprehend gender, sexual, and racial difference as ontological signification rather than 
approaching it merely as a sociological object.  
Conclusion: On coloniality and the possibility of liberation 
The political urgency of comprehending the coloniality of work lies in the need not only 
to address the persistence of inequality in work and organisation, but also, and more 
crucially, to confront the relentless expansion of the sphere of work and its continued 
global organisation along lines of gender, sexual, and racial difference. As noted earlier, in 
the former case, inequality is approached through structural and relational perspectives. 
For instance, Acker’s framework of inequality regimes has been appropriated as a useful 
method to study ‘patterns of inequality maintained by particular policies, rules, 
conventional practices of organizing work, and ways in which people interact with each 
other to get the work done’ (2011: 70). Similarly, the analytic of intersectionality is 
advanced as ‘a perspective that analyses race, gender, ethnicity, class, nationality and 
sexuality as simultaneous processes of identity, institutional and social practice, [and that 																																																								
6  Of course, this is not the universal condition of Indian women. However, the pervasiveness of poverty 
amongst Indian women, or amongst ‘women of the global south’ in general, substantiates the 
inseparability of ethical and economic dispossession. For more, cf. Wynter (2003) on the subsumption 
of biogenetic, especially racial, difference under economic difference, and Spivak (Spivak, 1999) on 
‘poorest woman of the South’ as the idealised object of global finance. 
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thereby] brings more complete and accurate analyses, as well as better organizational and 
policy change applications’ (Holvino, 2010: 266). These analyses, while necessary, are not 
sufficient to address the persistence of inequality. Relational and structural changes 
cannot offer an adequate solution to this problem unless we recognise why such 
relationships become legitimised in the first place.  The analytic of coloniality provides 
insight here.  
Indeed, the description of some forms of existence as degraded is precisely what 
authorises their activity as devalued. Materialist feminist analyses, especially, have 
advanced strong critiques of how the social subjugation of women, and the exclusion of 
reproductive labour from the sphere of productivity, has rendered women’s work as de- 
or under-valued (cf. Fortunati, 1995; Federici, 2004). To be sure, the devaluation of work 
as an effect on degraded existence is evidenced not merely in the context of 
reproduction, but also of slavery. Thus, in developing accounts of reproductive activity 
and slavery, materialist analyses are able to approach difference by addressing its role in 
the conceptualisation and operation of work. Yet, these accounts are incomplete, not 
only because of the lack of sustained engagement with race but also because, without 
such engagement, they cannot explain the emergence of the ‘migrant division of labour’ 
(Wills, Datta, Evans, Herbert & McIlwaine, 2009) and the ‘new international division of 
labor’ (cf. Federici, 2012) – neither of which is new but in fact an extension of the 
organisation of work under slavery and colonialism (cf. Nakano Glenn, 1992) – as 
anything but a manifestation of economic differentiation.  
In an attempt to address the persistence of domination and subjugation in and by work, 
some materialist analyses have turned to a refusal of work, described as ‘a potential mode 
of life that challenges the mode of life now defined by and subordinated to work’ 
(Weeks, 2011: 99). As such, it is a rejection of work as a moral(ising) ideology, and 
thereby signifies a resistance to, and an eventual liberation from, work as the site of 
domination and exploitation. This refusal is not a rejection of productive activity, per se, 
but rather a demand that such activity be self-valorising; that work be intended towards 
‘the enrichment of subjectivity, the expansion of needs, and the cultivation of an element 
or quality of desire that exceeds existing modes of satisfaction’ (2011: 103). This vision is 
posited as the condition of possibility for liberation.  
The process of producing value for oneself entails using one’s mental, physical and 
emotional capacities for the unfolding of the self rather than for the purpose of 
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exchange. In the contemporary circumstance produced by global capitalism, this 
possibility does not exist for those on the other side of the international division of 
labour for whom all daily activity is intended towards biological survival itself. Moreover, 
it is precisely this subjugated condition that has created the possibility for self-valorising 
activity on this side of the international division of labour. Indeed, as Spivak’s notes, the 
possibility of liberation realised through refusal seems to exist only when considering 
‘word-processors … as well as independent commodity production (hand-sewn leather 
sandals), our students’ complaint that they read literature for pleasure not interpretation, 
as well as most of our “creative” colleagues’ amused contempt for criticism beyond the 
review, and mainstream critics’ hostility to “theory”’ (1985: 79). This tongue-in-cheek 
critique is intended to underscore the proposition that self-valorising activity is possible 
only when and where productivity has reached highly advanced levels. Furthermore, this 
is achieved, she notes, only by restricting productivity on the other side of the 
international division of labour. This situation is reminiscent, once again, of the ethical 
dimension of accumulation by dispossession. 
Spivak’s critique thus makes clear the colonial lineage – the distinction between lives that 
have and can create value versus those that don’t and can’t – within which (the possibility 
for) the refusal of work sits. A vision of liberation based on such a refusal, then, seems to 
have little relevance – or rather, is of invidious consequence – to those yet maintained in 
an economically subjugated condition. Indeed, such discourses restage coloniality by 
tacitly maintaining the racial, gender, and sexual Other in an ‘‘objectivised’ mode’ 
(Quijano, 2007: 173). Given that economic subjugation is inseparable from, indeed 
sanctioned by, an ethical subjugation, it becomes incumbent upon critiques of work to 
grasp the production and role of the latter in domination and exploitation as manifest in 
and foundational to work. The refusal at stake, then, is not that of work but of the 
Eurocentred ethico-economic project that has come to be called modernity. 
What this necessitates is ‘epistemic decolonization’ (Escobar, 2007: 200; see also 
Grosfoguel, 2007, 2009; Quijano, 2007) or, at the very least, a reckoning with how our 
categories of thought and analysis come to be. This project is underway in many 
elsewheres and it is incumbent upon us to take a cue. It is here, in this scene of 
difference, that the horizon of liberation, finally, is visible.  
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